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Abstract 
While the 2015 Burmese election was a major victory for the pro-democracy National League 
for Democracy (NLD), this election poses an interesting puzzle: the NLD’s vote share in 2015 
was equivalent to that won by the pro-military Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 
in 2010 despite the fact turnout was nearly identical in both elections. This raises the possibility 
that many voters cast their ballot for a pro-military party with autocratic roots in 2010 and a 
party with a history of opposing military rule in 2015. We argue that tactical voting can explain 
this puzzle. Pro-democracy voters preferring another party may have voted tactically for the 
USDP in 2010 to stave off the ascent of an even more hardline authoritarian party. Conversely in 
2015 pro-democracy voters could cast their ballot for the NLD and pro-military voters had to 
vote tactically by rallying behind the USDP. These results have implications for how we 
understand voting behavior in elections taking place in transitioning contexts and in the shadow 
of authoritarian rule.  
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The 2015 elections in Myanmar produced a sizable victory for the National League for 
Democracy (NLD), led by pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi.  After boycotting the 2010 
elections due to what the NLD claimed was an unfair electoral system designed to prevent the 
NLD and its leader from competing, the NLD scored huge wins in the 2012 by-elections, which 
foretold a major landslide for the party in 2015.  Despite concerns the party would be robbed of 
its victory the same way it was after the 1990 elections (the only free and fair election up until 
that point, and the last election to be held for 20 years), the military accepted the results of the 
2015 election and allowed the NLD to take its seats in Parliament.   
 
Despite the scale of the NLD’s 2015 victory, its victory was not assured, and some doubted the 
party maintained the popularity it enjoyed in 1990.  In particular, there was a possibility the 
ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) might edge out the NLD (or at least 
prevent the party from winning a majority of seats).  This view was particularly shared by 
leading figures in the USDP, who anticipated a sizable vote for to the party to retain power.  This 
view was supported by the strong showing by the USDP in the 2010 elections, in which the party 
won just under 57 percent of the vote nationwide for the Pyithu Hluttaw (little different from the 
NLD’s 57 percent vote share in 2015).  Though the USDP would be reduced to just over 28 
percent in 2015, the scale of the party’s 2010 victory led some – especially, but not exclusively, 
within the USDP – to wonder whether the USDP would legitimately deny the NLD its expected 
victory at the ballot box.   
 
These election results present an interesting puzzle: what explains why the USDP was so 
successful in one election but defeated so badly in the next?  While the absence of the NLD in 
2010 is certainly the most obvious part of the story, the NLD boycott alone does not explain why 
the USDP won a vote share in 2010 roughly equaling the NLD’s vote share five years later.  
Particularly puzzling is the fact that the NLD’s landslide was not accompanied by a massive 
increase in turnout: contrary to the view that the NLD was propelled to victory in 2015 by a 
wave of voters who boycotted the 2010 elections in protest of undemocratic elections but turned 
out in 2015, turnout in 2015 was nearly identical to turnout in 2010 (22,423,369 votes in 2015, 
compared with 22,421,123 votes in 2010).  This means that a sizable share of voters cast their 
ballots for the NLD in 2015 would have supported a pro-military regime party like the USDP or 
competing in 2010.  But how could this be given the NLD’s commitment to democracy?   
 
To explain how these results could occur, we examine nationwide election results in 2010 and 
2015, as well as the by-elections of 2012.  We argue that the discrepancy between the 2010 and 
2015 results is due to voters shifting their voting behavior to match the changes in party 
offerings.  In particular, we argue that the absence of the NLD in 2010 and the presence of 
another pro-military party, the National Unity Party (NUP), created incentives for tactical voting 
by erstwhile NLD supporters. The considerable presence of the pro-authoritarian NUP, which 
gained nearly 20% of the vote in 2010, created a spatial dynamic in which the USDP was a more 
soft line, albeit still pro-military, offering than the NUP.  Voters who preferred the NLD 
therefore had incentives to cast their ballot for the USDP in 2010 to decisively keep the NUP 
from power.  Once the NLD was able to compete in 2012 and 2015 the spatial distribution of 
parties shifted and the USDP was now a hardline party relative to the NLD. The NUP faded into 
irrelevance as its voters shifted to the USDP as the party with the best chance of adopting 
conservative pro-military policies.   
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These changes in voting behavior, we argue, reflect Burmese voters trying to maximize the 
benefits they receive from the outcome of elections in ways that reflect their preference orderings 
– much like voters in Western democracies.  This argument has bearings not only for the future 
of Burmese politics, but also for the dynamics of elections in hybrid authoritarian and 
transitioning regimes.  If the military wished to use its incumbency advantage to lock in its 
electoral power, it underestimated both the popularity of the NLD and the capacity for 
Myanmar’s electorate to vote tactically.  This finding adds to existing evidence that while the 
outgoing military junta may have done a good job of solidifying its constitutional and economic 
power , it failed in entrenching its electoral power.   
 
This paper begins with an empirical puzzle, applies theoretical approaches to posit explanations, 
tests them against the empirical record, and derives further theoretical implications from the 
findings. The next section examines the details of the Burmese case in greater detail whilst 
spelling out the puzzle addressed in this paper.  Following that, we outline the theory behind our 
argument.  The section after that explains the details of our research design before proceeding to 
a section discussing the results of our analysis.  A concluding section discusses implications of 
this finding for the future of electoral democracy in Myanmar and for the study of elections in 
transitioning regimes.   
 
 
Elections and Party Politics in Myanmar 
 
Elections during the period of Ne Win’s dictatorship from 1962 to 1988 had mostly been 
showpiece affairs in which Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) would win between 85% 
and 100% of the vote with over 90% voter turnout (Morgenbesser 2015).  After nationwide 
protests throughout 1988, Ne Win resigned and the subsequent military junta that took power 
promised to hold multiparty elections.  The NLD won those elections in 1990, which were the 
first free and fair elections in the country’s history.  After seeing its favored party trounced in the 
elections, the military argued that the vote was actually to populate a constitutional assembly, not 
to form a government (see Tonkin, 2007).  In nullifying the results, military leaders instituted a 
regime that would allow them to dominate Burmese politics for the next two decades as it drafted 
a new constitution (Dukalskis 2009).  The military liberalized on its own terms, releasing a 
constitution in 2008 and scheduling elections for 2010.  
 
Although elections were held in 2010, the NLD – which had been victorious in 1990 – declined 
to compete.  The NLD boycotted because electoral laws at the time required it to expel its leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi in order to contest the poll on the grounds that she had a criminal record 
(which itself stemmed from politically motivated persecution of her) (BBC 2010).  While many 
assumed that the 2010 elections would be a ruse designed as part of a strategy to keep the 
military in power (see Pedersen 2011; Williams 2011), to declare these elections completely 
unfree and unfair would be a mistake. Certainly, the country’s strict laws regarding the eligibility 
of candidates (and their parties) serving prison sentences and/or with foreign ties made 
competition difficult for politicians like Aung San Suu Kyi, who was under house-arrest during 
the 2010 elections (Burma Fund, 2011).  Even more consequential were the country’s censorship 
laws and intimidation, which made it difficult for opposition parties to compete effectively 
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(Dukalskis 2017).   
 
Even with these obvious deficiencies in mind, the fact remains that the 2010 elections were 
indeed multiparty elections, with 47 registered parties competing.  Even though the USDP won a 
clear victory, several other parties were able to compete effectively and win substantial vote 
shares, with some even winning parliamentary representation.  The Varieties of Democracy (V-
DEM: 2018) project, which measures the quality and extent democracy globally since 1900, 
coded Myanmar’s 2010 election as freer and fairer than the 1990 elections in terms of 
registration fraud, systematic irregularities, opposition intimidation, vote buying, and electoral 
violence. When measuring the elections against a thick conception of high-quality democracy 
that includes factors such as freedom of expression, quality of representation, level of fraud, and 
so on, the 1990 and 2010 elections are coded as roughly the same.   
 
After 2010 and the ascent of reformist USDP president Thein Sein, two major rounds of 
elections were held in which the NLD were given sufficient assurances that they would be 
allowed to compete effectively, and thus contested the elections alongside the other major parties 
that had competed in 2010. These were the by-elections of 2012 to replace 40 seats in the Pyithu 
Hluttaw that had been vacated after the 2010 elections (37 of which were contested; three in 
Kachin State were postponed), and the 2015 general elections. In the 2012 by-elections, the NLD 
would go on to win every seat. These by-election victories foretold the landslide that was to 
come in 2015, in which the NLD would win a commanding majority of seats in the Pyithu 
Hluttaw (the lower house of Parliament) and displace the USDP from government (see Dukalskis 
and Raymond, 2017). Only the military’s reserved seats (25 percent of the total number of seats) 
would prevent the NLD from being able to amend the constitution unilaterally.   
 
The vote and seat shares for the major parties in 2010 and 2015 elections to the Pyithu Hluttaw 
are listed in Table 1. In 2010, the USDP won a majority of both the vote and seat shares. Two 
other parties won sizable vote shares as well: the National Unity Party (NUP), which was the 
party formally representing the military’s interests until the formation of the USDP, and the 
National Democratic Force (NDF), which was a collection of politicians who broke away from 
the NLD in order to contest the 2010 elections. Although both parties garnered respectable vote 
shares across most of the country (though these were not of any real threat to the USDP’s 
victory), neither party won many seats due to the bias against smaller parties in first-past-the-
post (FPTP) electoral systems like the one used in Burmese elections (on the impact of FPTP 
systems on the translation of votes into seats, see the seminal studies by Duverger [1954] and 
Rae [1967]).   
 
Table 1 about here 
 
By 2015, the USDP was swept out of power by the NLD, which won not only a majority of 
seats, but also a majority of votes across the country. The USDP, in contrast, was reduced to less 
than half its 2010 vote share, while both the NUP and NDF were effectively wiped out. One 
interesting aspect of the reversal of fortunes for the USDP is that although the NLD won an even 
larger seat majority than its vote majority (due, again, to the workings of the FPTP system), the 
party’s vote share was almost identical to that of the USDP in 2010.   
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In addition to winning a nearly identical vote share, the NLD’s constituency-level vote shares in 
2015 were distributed in a very similar fashion to those of the USDP in 2010. This can be seen in 
Figure 2, which presents box plots summarizing the constituency-level vote shares for both the 
NLD and USDP in 2010 and 2015 in all constituencies across the country. The box plot for the 
USDP in 2010 shows that the USDP’s constituency-level vote share in 2010 ranged largely 
between 42.0 and 69.6 percent (the lower and upper quartiles of the distribution), with a median 
of 55.4 percent. While the party’s vote share dropped dramatically in 2015, the NLD’S 2015 vote 
share had a similar distribution, ranging largely between 38.1 and 68.9 percent, with a median of 
56.6 percent.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
These findings highlight an interesting puzzle: how could the USDP do so well in one election, 
only to be defeated so badly in the next? Certainly, the USDP expected to attract more votes than 
it did in 2015 due to its recent record in government. Not only did the USDP-led government 
extend civil liberties and manage a successful transition to democracy, but the economy grew at 
tremendous pace: according to World Bank data, the economy grew by an average of 7.65 
percent from 2010-2015. With such a record of success, the USDP expected to be rewarded by 
voters in 2015 despite the presence of the NLD.  
 
The literature on voting behavior would support such a perspective, too. A long line of literature 
on retrospective voting suggests that while voters will punish incumbents for bad records in 
office, they will also reward incumbents for good performance (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981). In 
particular, the literature on economic voting shows that incumbents are rewarded by voters for 
their good stewardship of the economy (Lewis-Beck, 1990; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007), a 
finding which applies to non-democratic governments (Lewis-Beck, Tang, and Martini, 2014). 
All this suggests the USDP would have benefited from strong economic performance along with 
the other liberal and democratic reforms pursued in recent years. The fact they did not, then, 
makes the party’s reversal of fortunes in 2015 all the more interesting.  
 
One possible explanation for the success of the NLD in 2015 is that there was a major increase in 
turnout between 2010 and 2015 as millions of NLD voters came to the polls after boycotting the 
2010 elections and displaced the USDP vote. This argument is consistent with the literature on 
critical realignments and realigning elections in Western democracies (Key, 1955; Burnham, 
1970; Mayhew, 2002, p.144), which argue that rapid realignments are accompanied by major 
increases in turnout. This was most clearly the case with the emergence of socialist parties in 
Western Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: with the expansion of the 
franchise to the working classes, Western party systems experienced major realignments as the 
newly enfranchised voters fueled the success of socialist parties (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; 
Rokkan, 1970; Bartolini and Mair, 1990). If correct, this literature predicts that the NLD 
landslide in 2015 – and the 2012 by-election victories that preceded the 2015 elections – was due 
to a major increase in voter turnout.   
 
The data, however, suggest that explanations rooted in differences in turnout cannot explain the 
changes in the aggregate election outcomes observed since 2010. For one, turnout appears to 
have been consistent across time: whereas 22,421,123 people cast votes in 2010 out of around 
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29,000,000 eligible voters (Burma Fund, 2011),
1
 turnout in 2015 only increased to 22,423,369 in 
2015. Thus, there was no major groundswell of support for the NLD in 2015 that did not also 
vote for the USDP in 2010. Additionally, Figure 2 presents box plots of turnout figures in each 
constituency in which at least two parties contested the seat. The data show that while turnout 
may have changed between 2010 and 2015 in particular constituencies, on average, the spread of 
turnout figures in both elections is nearly identical, as are the median levels of turnout. In 2010, 
turnout ranged between the lower and upper quartiles of 28,379 and 94,626 voters, with median 
turnout at 56,984 voters; in 2015, the lower and upper quartiles ranged between 34,552 and 
97,805 voters, while the median turnout was less than 10,000 votes higher than in 2010 at 66,602 
voters.  Though there was a significant increase in average constituency-level turnout between 
the two elections, this was not of the proportions that could explain the massive shifts in the vote 
totals observed in Table 1 above. Moreover, the fact that turnout in 2015 overall was only a little 
over 2,000 votes high than in 2010 (with the discrepancy between average constituency-level 
turnout due to the greater variance in 2010 turnout at the high end of the turnout scale) reinforces 
this conclusion. Together, these data suggest the NLD landslide in 2015 was not supported by a 
massive increase in turnout.   
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
This conclusion is supported further by looking at constituencies over time. In particular, we 
focus on the 37 constituencies in which there was a by-election in 2012. Examining these 
particular constituencies allows us to determine whether the landslide victories by the NLD in 
the 2012 by-elections were supported by an upsurge in turnout (one that was sustained in 2015), 
which displaced the USDP because its staunch supporters were smaller in number. To examine 
turnout in these constituencies over time and whether the NLD’s 2012 and 2015 landslide 
victories were the result of increased turnout, we produce a correlation matrix examining the 
pairwise correlations between turnout in each election on the one hand and NLD and USDP vote 
shares on the other.   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
This correlation matrix appears in Table 2. The data show that turnout across the three elections 
is highly correlated, suggesting that turnout was relatively constant across the three elections. 
Moreover, turnout is not correlated with support for the NLD, which further suggests that the rise 
of the NLD was not due to a major increase in turnout. Moreover, turnout is significantly and 
negatively correlated with only the 2015 USDP vote share, and even then only 2015 turnout is 
significantly correlated (and weakly so). This suggests that the NLD was not swept to power by a 
wave of increased turnout in either 2012 or 2015.   
 
Thus, the discussion above suggests there is an interesting puzzle to be explained. Although the 
NLD won a convincing victory in 2015, the fact remains that the USDP won an equally 
convincing victory five years earlier in the 2010 elections. This difference between the two 
elections cannot be explained by differences in turnout, as turnout in 2015 was only marginally 
                                               
1
 Though there are serious concerns with Myanmar’s restrictive laws regarding voter eligibility, 
the number of eligible voters is not much different from the voting-age population, estimated to 
be around 30,000,000 (United Nations, 2015).  
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higher than in 2010. This suggests that many 2010 USDP voters (and perhaps other parties’ 
voters as well) switched to vote for the NLD in 2015. This begs the question, given the 
differences between the NLD’s demands for democracy and the support for the military regime 
among the USDP and other parties, how and why could NLD voters have supported one of the 
pro-regime parties in 2010? While there have been several excellent studies of Myanmar’s recent 
elections (e.g. Marsten 2013; Selway 2015; Thawnghmung 2016; Rhoden 2017), to our 
knowledge there has been no systematic exploration of this question.  The next section turns to 
explain how this could be and how such changes in voting behavior, in turn, could explain the 
differences in outcomes between 2010 and 2015.   
  
 
Party Preferences and Voting Behavior in First-Past-the-Post Systems 
 
An abundance of literature suggests that the shifts in aggregate outcomes observed since 2010 
can be explained as due to voters shifting their behavior in response to how the available choices 
of parties match their preference orderings. One of the principal models of voting behavior 
(Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Merrill and Grofman, 1999) is based on the idea that 
voters hold preferences that are fixed (i.e. unchanging), rank ordered, and transferable (i.e. if a 
party choice was eliminated, voters preferring that party would transfer their support to the next 
available party in their rank ordering of parties). Assuming voters are unconstrained in their 
ability to choose freely, voters will select the party closest to their own preferences. If, for 
instance, preferences can be arranged along a single dimension of competition and parties 
compete by adopting a position on that dimension, voters locate themselves along this axis of 
competition and choose the party closest to their own.   
 
While the underlying tendency is for voters to select the party closest to their own positions, 
voters are often constrained in their ability to choose their most-preferred party by the electoral 
system. This is particularly the case in first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral systems like the one 
used in Burmese elections. In FPTP systems, the party that wins the most votes – even if this 
number only constitutes a plurality of the vote – wins the seat. This means that if a party places 
second or worse in constituencies across the country, it will fail to win any seats – even if the 
party wins a sizable number of votes. Particularly disadvantaged are third parties: while the top-
two parties often win a sizable number of seats, third parties routinely fail to win many seats, 
resulting in severely disproportionate ratios of seat to vote shares.   
 
One consequence of FPTP systems is that the mechanics of translating votes into seats has a 
psychological effect on the behavior of voters. For voters supporting a party likely to place third 
or worse in their district, it will make sense to desert that party in favor of a less-preferred party 
with a better chance of winning if supporting one’s most-preferred party results in a party 
winning the district that they prefer even less (McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972; Riker, 1982; 
Cox, 1997, pp. 78-79). Even though one is not able to elect their most-preferred party, electing 
the second most-preferred party is better than one’s least-preferred party being elected because 
the second most-preferred party is closer to one’s position than the least-preferred party. Such 
‘tactical voting’ – and in particular, the transfer of support to less-preferred parties in order to 
prevent even worse outcomes – helps to explain why many third parties in FPTP systems fail to 
win many votes.   
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The logic and implications of fixed, ordered, and transferable preferences applied to the case of 
Myanmar helps to explain the aggregate patterns of vote shares observed since 2010. First, the 
strong performance of the USDP, NUP, and NDF in 2010 followed by the collapse of these 
parties’ vote shares in 2015 despite roughly consistent turnout in both elections can be explained 
by the absence of the NLD. Voters showing up to both the 2010 and 2015 elections would have 
needed to vote for another party in 2010 (as voting for the NLD was not an option). Assuming 
they had ordered preferences, these voters would simply have voted for their second most-
preferred party in their preference ordering.   
 
This NLD vote would have divided among the available list of major parties that did compete, 
including the NUP, USDP, and NDF. The NUP grew out of the socialist-militarist authoritarian 
party of Ne Win, the BSPP (Stokke et al. 2015). Its authoritarian legacy and the fact that it was 
the military proxy party in the stolen election of 1990 means that its credentials as a “hard line” 
authoritarian party were well established (see O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). The USDP, while 
also a military-aligned party, nonetheless is associated with Myanmar’s partial liberalization 
from 2008 to 2010, and could be seen as more of a “soft line” authoritarian party than the NUP. 
The absence of the NLD in 2010 means that voters with pro-democracy preferences therefore 
had incentives to vote in that election for the USDP. Once the NLD contested the 2012 and 2015 
polls, those voters had no reason to vote for the USDP unless they were persuaded by its 
performance in the interim. Though some of each party’s vote share was doubtlessly rooted in 
the support of loyal partisans whose first preferences were each of these parties, this argument 
predicts that the discrepancies in the outcomes between 2010 and 2015 can be explained as low-
preference voting behavior when most voters’ first preference did not contest the election; when 
the NLD did compete in 2015, these voters switched their votes to the NLD.   
 
Applying arguments regarding the transfer of votes to less-preferred parties in FPTP systems 
may help to explain why the USDP continued to fare relatively well in 2015 when the other 
major parties did not. At this point the tactical voting story changes and pro-NUP voters now had 
strong incentives in a FPTP system to cast their ballot for the more soft-line USDP as the pro-
military party with the best chance of securing power. Because the USDP was the largest party 
going into the 2015 elections, it was best placed to encourage and attract tactical votes from pro-
regime voters. For voters supportive of the military regime, the USDP offered the best chance of 
stopping the NLD from taking control of government. This would have particularly been the case 
with NUP voters, as the NUP is the party that formerly controlled the country after the 1990 
elections.  
 
In addition to tactical voting among 2010 NUP voters, we would predict that the collapse in NDF 
vote shares was due to their 2010 voters voting tactically in 2012 and 2015. Although some pro-
democracy voters who supported the NDF in 2010 may have wanted to stick with the party in 
2015, these voters would have been better served by voting tactically for the NLD. While the 
NLD may have been less preferable to these voters than the NDF, voting tactically for the NLD 
offered the best chance for democrats of all stripes to defeat the military in 2015. In addition to 
the likelihood of tactical voting among pro-democracy voters, there is also reason to expect 
similar behavior among pro-regime voters as well. For those NDF voters placing themselves 
closer to the USDP’s position on the democracy-authoritarianism axis than the NLD’s position, 
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voting tactically for the USDP would be preferable than supporting the NDF in 2012 and 2015 
due to the fact that the USDP’s chances of defeating the NLD were greater than the NDF’s.   
 
 
Data and Method 
 
To examine whether there was evidence of voters shifting their behavior in response to both the 
presence/absence of the NLD and the incentives provided by the FPTP system, we examine 
aggregate vote totals from the 2010 and 2015 general elections to the Pyithu Hluttaw, as well as 
the 2012 by-elections. Lacking individual-level data regarding voters’ preferences, examining 
aggregate-level data is able to provide clear – albeit indirect – evidence of such shifts in voting 
behavior. If we see systematic shifts in votes from one election to the next between parties in 
ways hypothesized in the previous section, then this would provide evidence that these shifts 
were due to voters realigning their behavior in response to the presence of the NLD and the 
incentives provided by the FPTP system.   
 
We focus on data from the 37 constituencies contested in both the 2010 and 2015 elections to the 
Pyithu Hluttaw, as well as the 2012 by-elections. Examining these constituencies allows us to 
examine how support for the USDP evolved over time. We focus on estimating support for the 
USDP across the three elections because they were the two largest parties which were capable of 
attracting tactical votes from pro-democracy and pro-regime voters, respectively. Specifically, 
examining these constituencies allows us to estimate how much of the support for the parties 
competing in 2010 sincerely preferred the USDP – versus those preferring other parties but 
voting tactically the USDP. Because the number of voters turning out to vote in these 37 
constituencies was relatively consistent across the three elections, examining the impact of 2010 
vote shares for the three parties mentioned above – USDP, NUP, and NDF – on 2012 and 2015 
USDP vote shares allows us to estimate the share of 2010 USDP voters who voted consistently 
for the USDP across the three elections, as well as the shares of 2010 NUP and NDF voters who 
shifted their voting behavior in response to the emergence of the NLD by voting tactically for the 
USDP in 2012 and 2015.
2
 Additionally, by examining USDP vote shares in both 2012 and 2015, 
we are able to estimate whether tactical voting increased in the 2015 elections in response to the 
strong performance of the NLD in 2012.   
 
In terms of expectations, we should see that some measure of support for the USDP in 2012 and 
2015 came from NUP supporters voting tactically for the USDP. In addition to the USDP’s core 
voters who remained loyal to the party in 2012 and 2015 (a share we can estimate using the 2010 
USDP vote shares), we would expect that a sizable share of voters preferring and voting for the 
NUP in 2010 voted tactically for the USDP in 2012 in order to try to prevent the NLD from 
winning their constituency. As it became even clearer the NLD were the party to beat going into 
the 2015 elections, we would expect the share of NUP voters voting tactically for the USDP to 
have increased even further. To a lesser extent, such tactical voting may have been observable 
among a share of 2010 NDF voters as well.   
                                               
2
 Though there is an obvious concern that these three variables are not independent of one 
another – as higher vote shares for one party lead to lower vote shares for the other two – the 
larger concern of multicollinearity due to this non-independence is not merited in this instance: 
variance inflation factor scores for these variables are all under acceptable limits.  
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Additionally, the discussion in the previous section predicts we should observe that a share of 
2010 NDF voters (i.e. the most pro-regime voters) voted tactically for the USDP. While we 
might expect that the bulk of 2010 NDF voters supported the NLD in 2012 and 2015 due to the 
fact the NDF was founded by several breakaway NLD members and took one of the clearest pro-
democracy positions of parties contesting the 2010 elections, we would expect that a nontrivial 
share of the NDF’s most pro-regime voters voted tactically for the USDP in 2012 and 2015. To 
be sure, when faced with a choice between the two largest parties – the pro-democracy NLD and 
the pro-regime USDP – most 2010 NDF voters were probably closer to the NLD’s position on a 
democracy-authoritarianism axis. However, we would expect that those 2010 NDF voters 
located closer to the USDP’s position than the NLD’s voted tactically for the USDP (instead of 
voting sincerely for the NDF).  
 
To estimate the impact of such transfers on 2012 and 2015 USDP vote shares, we model each 
party’s vote share in each election separately using the 2010 vote shares of the USDP, NUP, and 
NDF in the 37 constituencies contested in the 2010 and 2015 general elections, as well as the 
2012 by-elections. In addition to variables measuring each party’s 2010 vote shares, we also 
include a variable measuring the change in turnout between 2010 and the election in question 
(e.g. change in turnout between 2010 and 2012 in models predicting NLD 2012 vote shares) to 
account for the possibility that the USDP’s collapse (and the NLD’s success) was due primarily 
to increases in turnout since 2010, as voters who sat out the 2010 elections in solidarity with the 
NLD’s boycott turned out to vote for the NLD in 2012 and 2015. To account for variance 
specific to each state, dummy variables for each state were also included.  
 
Models were estimated using seemingly unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962). We use this 
estimator due to the likelihood that estimates from each election are correlated; as a result of this 
correlation, estimating each variable separately will result in standard errors that are downwardly 
biased. Using seemingly unrelated regression corrects for this possibility by adjusting for the 
correlation observed in the error terms of each model.   
 
 
Results 
 
The results are presented in Table 3. We begin by analyzing the coefficients for the constant in 
each equation. While y-intercepts often lack interesting substantive interpretations, we must 
interpret the constant in these equations because each represents an across-the-board vote penalty 
for the USDP.
3
 The coefficient of -0.18 suggests that – net of the other variables in the model – 
the USDP lost 18 percentage points in each constituency from its 2010 vote share in 2015 (while 
                                               
3
 While we cannot be certain that these coefficients reflect only tactical or other forms of 
preference-based voting – e.g. campaign effects or local contexts – part of the vote penalty 
represented by each coefficient may reflect preference-based voting on top of what is implied by 
the coefficients for each of the three party-specific vote share variables.  Though we cannot 
interpret how much of these estimated vote penalties is due to preference-based voting behavior, 
this means that the extent of tactical voting and preference-based party switching between 
elections may be underestimated, thereby highlighting the importance of such explanations for 
understanding the changes observed between 2010 and 2015.   
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the coefficient of -0.11 suggests that the party lost 11 percentage points from its 2010 
constituency-level vote share in the 2012 by-elections). These results are in keeping with the 
argument that many voters casting ballots in both 2010 and 2015 sincerely preferred the NLD, 
but because they could not vote for the party, the USDP (and other parties contesting the 2010 
elections) benefited from the NLD’s absence; when given the chance to vote for the NLD in 
2015, these voters switched their votes away from these parties and opted for the NLD.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Turning to the coefficients for the three party-specific predictors of USDP vote shares in 2012 
and 2015, the results confirm the conclusions reached above suggesting that many 2010 USDP 
voters continued to vote for the party in 2012 and 2015. The coefficient of 0.58 implies that as 
2010 USDP vote shares increase by one percentage point, 2015 USDP vote shares increase by 
0.58 percentage points.  This relationship suggests that – after discounting the across-the-board 
18 percentage point reduction in USDP support, and after accounting for differences in turnout 
between the two elections – 58 percent of 2010 USDP voters continued to support the USDP in 
2015 because they preferred the USDP over all alternatives. A considerably smaller (though still 
sizable) proportion (0.43, or 43 percent) of 2010 USDP voters supported the party in 2012.  
 
These results suggest that a significant proportion of voters turning out in all three elections 
sincerely preferred the USDP.  While the shares of 2010 USDP voters defecting to the NLD 
dealt a huge blow to the USDP’s vote shares in 2012 and 2015 (in turn, explaining why we 
observed such a wild swing from the USDP to the NLD in 2015), one reason why the USDP’s 
vote share did not collapse to a greater degree than it did in 2012 and 2015 is because a sizable 
share of the party’s 2010 voters preferred the USDP over all other alternatives – even after the 
NLD entered the 2015 contest. That said, while many 2010 USDP voters sincerely preferred the 
USDP over all alternatives – and thus voted consistently for the USDP across the three elections 
– a sizable proportion preferred and thus voted for the USDP in 2010 when the NLD did not 
contest the election, but switched to vote for the NLD in 2012 and/or 2015 because they 
preferred the NLD over the USDP.   
 
The coefficients for the variables measuring 2010 NUP and NDF vote shares imply that another 
reason why the USDP maintained a sizable vote share in 2015 while parties like the NUP and 
NDF did not is that the USDP benefitted from tactical voting. As the largest pro-regime party, 
the USDP was best placed to prevent the NLD from winning in 2015. Given this, the USDP was 
also best placed to attract tactical votes from pro-regime voters in both the NUP and NDF 
looking to defeat the NLD.
4
 The coefficients for NUP and NDF vote shares suggest many – 
though not most – voters preferring the NUP or NDF over other alternatives preferred the USDP 
                                               
4
 One interesting example illustrates this tactical behavior. In the constituency of Thanatpin, the 
NUP won in 2010 with nearly 75 percent of the vote while the NDF finished in second with the 
remaining 25 percent; the USDP did not contest the seat so as not to waste resources on a safe 
seat for the NUP. With the emergence of the NLD in 2012 and 2015 (which won with 77 and 68 
percent of the vote, respectively, in those elections), many pro-regime NUP and NDF voters 
switched their support to the USDP, which contested Thanatpin in 2012 and 2015 and won 19 
and 24 percent of the vote, respectively (while the NDF did not contest the election and the NUP 
garnered only three and four percent of the vote, respectively).  
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over the NLD. This is reflected in the positive coefficients for both parties in the models 
predicting support for the USDP in 2012 and 2015, which imply that considerable shares 
(though, again, not a majority) of both parties’ voters voted tactically for the USDP as the party 
with the best chance to defeat the NLD. Interesting to note is that the coefficients for both parties 
are larger in 2015 than 2012. This suggests that while some 2010 NUP and NDF voters may 
have continued to support these same parties in 2012,
5
 when faced with the prospect of a NLD 
government in 2015, even more voters preferring the NUP and NDF voted tactically for the 
USDP. That said, the fact that less than a majority of both parties’ voters supported the USDP in 
2015 suggests that significant shares of both parties’ bases of 2010 voters voted for the NLD in 
2012 and 2015 because they preferred the NLD over these and all other parties.  
 
It is also interesting to note that these results hold despite accounting for the impact of changes in 
turnout on support for the USDP. In contrast to the argument that the NLD’s success was due to 
massive swings in new voters who stayed home in 2010 turning out in 2012/2015, the variable 
measuring the impact of change in turnout since 2010 is not significantly correlated with USDP 
vote shares in 2012. While increases in turnout are associated with significantly lower vote 
shares for the USDP in 2015, this finding does not alter the conclusions reached above noting 
that USDP support in 2010 was strongly correlated with higher vote shares for the party in 
2012/2015.  
 
In summary, the results presented here suggest that the reason for the dramatic shifts in voting 
behavior between 2010 and 2015 was that a considerable share of voters altered their voting 
behavior in line with their preference orderings. While many voters preferred the USDP over 
other alternatives in 2010, a sizable share of 2010 USDP voters preferred the NLD over the 
USDP, and thus voted for the NLD when it contested the 2012 and 2015 elections.  This helps to 
explain the dramatic shift from the USDP majority in 2010 to the NLD majority in 2015. Such 
preference-based voting also helps to explain the demise of parties like the NUP and NDF. Pro-
regime voters supporting the NUP and NDF in 2010 voted tactically for the USDP in 2012 and 
2015 because they preferred the USDP to the NLD – which in turn helped to sustain the USDP 
whilst the NUP and NDF vote shares collapsed. Though some 2010 NUP and NDF voters voted 
tactically for the USDP, and while a smaller share continued to support these parties in 2012 and 
2015, a large share of these parties’ 2010 voters voted for the NLD in 2012 and 2015, suggesting 
these parties did because they preferred the NLD to all alternatives.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper examined the puzzling finding that emerged between the 2010 and 2015 elections in 
Myanmar: even though voter turnout remained constant between 2010 and 2015, there were 
sizable shifts in the outcomes, with the pro-military USDP winning roughly the same share of the 
vote as the pro-democracy NLD. To explain these outcomes, we draw from the cross-national 
                                               
5
 Replicating the analyses in Table 3 using NUP and NDF vote shares as the dependent variables 
suggests roughly four and six percent of 2010 NUP voters continued to support the party in 2012 
and 2015, respectively; an estimated three percent of 2010 NDF voters supported the party again 
in 2012, while the share of 2010 NDF voters supporting the party in 2015 was indistinguishable 
from zero.  
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literature regarding the impact of preference orderings on voting behavior. This literature 
suggests that many voters supporting one of the parties that competed in 2010 only did so 
because their most-preferred party – the NLD – did not contest the 2010 elections. When offered 
the choice to support the NLD in 2015, many of these voters apparently switched to support the 
NLD in 2015. Moreover, the NLD was supported by tactical voting, whereby pro-democracy 
voters preferring other parties voted for the NLD in order to prevent the pro-military USDP from 
winning another term in government.   
 
Our findings support the argument that the reason for the changes in outcomes is that a 
significant share of voters realigned their voting behavior in 2015 in response to the emergence 
of the NLD. Though a number of 2010 USDP voters backed the party again in 2015 because they 
preferred the USDP over the alternatives, a majority of USDP voters switched to vote for the 
NLD in 2015. The results presented above suggest that while many 2010 USDP voters preferred 
the USDP over the alternative parties competing in 2010, they switched to vote for the NLD in 
2015 because they preferred the NLD over the USDP.   
 
Additionally, the results also suggest that the major changes in party fortunes is due to a 
significant amount of tactical voting. The results suggest that a majority of voters supporting the 
NUP and NDF in 2010 voted tactically for the less-preferred NLD in order to defeat the USDP.  
The results also suggest that the USDP has benefitted from a considerable amount of tactical 
voting from NUP and NDF voters. Although these voters do not constitute a majority, significant 
shares of both parties’ 2010 voters switched to support the USDP in 2015, suggesting that while 
they may have preferred the NUP or NDF, they voted tactically for the USDP in order to 
maximize the chances of defeating the NLD.  
 
These findings have larger implications for the study of elections and authoritarian transitions. 
The first concerns the importance of institutional design and authoritarian learning. The 
conventional wisdom about Myanmar’s liberalization in 2010 was that the military opened up 
from a position of relative strength and could control the process.  This means that it had a 
unique opportunity to craft institutions to its advantage.  And yet, it chose an electoral system ill-
suited to its own perpetuation in power and underestimated the capacity of the electorate to vote 
tactically. This findings adds to literature that questions the ability of authoritarian leaders to 
craft institutions that do precisely what they want them to do in the ways they prefer (Pepinsky 
2014). Autocrats sometimes misread and misunderstand institutions in ways that functional 
analyses miss.  Second, authoritarian legacy parties are not the same and pro-democracy voters 
may vote tactically for the “lesser of two evils” amid a boycott by major pro-democracy parties. 
In addition to examining why opposition parties boycott elections and how it influences their 
performance in that election, this case highlights that boycotts can shape electoral results 
multiple cycles into the future.  This has special relevance for hybrid and liberalizing regimes in 
which elections are treated seriously.  Third, reserve domains put pressure on democratically 
elected-parties. Myanmar’s military holds enormous extra-electoral power in the current political 
system.  The civilian politicians hold portfolios that are difficult to in which so succeed for an 
underdeveloped country: health, education, transport, and so on.  Delivering progress in these 
areas is difficult and so failure may see voters punish elected parties while the military retains its 
institutional advantages.  Comparative analysis of reserve domains may illuminate these 
processes and test hypotheses about such institutional arrangements.   
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Turning to Myanmar, it is worth considering a recent study by Morgenbesser and Pepinsky 
(2018), which argued that elections in Southeast Asia are more often the result of 
democratization processes rather than the cause of democratization. With regard to Myanmar’s 
2015 election specifically, the study is skeptical of the impact of the result to further democratize 
Myanmar. And yet, looking forward to the future of Burmese politics, the results suggest a 
favorable future for pro-democracy parties going forward. Assuming the military does not undo 
the democratic domains of politics in Myanmar since the NLD’s landslide victory in 2015, and 
early signs suggest the military will remain respectful of the outcome of the 2015 election, the 
fact that the results presented here suggest pro-democracy voters outnumbered pro-regime voters 
– despite the numbers voting tactically for the USDP to prevent the pro-democracy NLD from 
winning – mean that future party-based efforts opposing the NLD’s vision for democracy will 
likely fail at the ballot box. Although the future looks bleak for the politics currently supported 
by authoritarian legacy parties, the results suggest there is opportunity for parties like the USDP 
to transform themselves into legitimate opposition parties if they play by the new rules of the 
game. Because the NLD’s majority vote share in 2015 was supported to a significant extent by 
tactical voting, this means an opposition party perceived to respect democracy may be able to 
appeal to those swing voters and have a chance of displacing the NLD from power. If one of the 
parties defeated in 2015 is willing to play by the rules of elections, that party might have a 
chance to defeat the NLD by appealing to voters’ concerns rooted in economic issues and/or 
issues related to Myanmar’s ethnic and religious diversity.   
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Figure 1: Constituency-Level Vote Shares for the USDP and NLD in the 2010 and 2015 
Elections to the Pyithu Hluttaw 
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Figure 2: Constituency-Level Turnout in the 2010 and 2015 Elections to the Pyithu Hluttaw 
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Table 1: Vote and Seat Percentages for Selected Parties in the 2010 and 2015 elections to the 
Pyithu Hluttaw 
 
      2010    2015   
Party     Votes  Seats  Votes  Seats 
 
Union Solidarity and Development  
Party     56.76  58.86  28.28  6.80 
National League for Democracy -  -  57.06  58.00 
National Unity Party   19.44  2.73  1.87  0.00 
National Democratic Force  7.10  1.82  0.50  0.00 
 
Percentages under votes are the percentages of ‘Votes’ nationwide while percentages under ‘Seats’ are the 
percentages of the total number of seats in the House of Representatives.  Note that column percentages do not sum 
to 100 due to missing parties (in the case of vote percentages) and the omission of the seats explicitly reserved for 
the military.   
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Turnout, % USDP, and % NLD Variables in the 37 
Constituencies Contested in 2010, 2012, and 2015 
 
             Turnout ____         % USDP ____    % NLD___ 
Variables  2010 2012 2015 2010 2012 2015 2012 2015 
2010 Turnout  1 
2012 Turnout  0.93* 1 
2015 Turnout  0.88* 0.90* 1 
2010 % USDP  0.06 -0.09 -0.03 1 
2012 % USDP  0.07 -0.10 0.01 0.64* 1 
2015 % USDP  -0.08 -0.18 -0.34* 0.42* 0.68* 1 
2012 % NLD  -0.10 0.07 -0.05 -0.51* -0.94* -0.67* 1 
2015 % NLD   -0.18 -0.05 -0.17 -0.36* -0.82* -0.62* 0.92* 1 
Entries are Pearson’s product-moment correlations.  * p < 0.05, two-tailed tests.  n = 37 for all correlations.  
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Table 3: Regression Analysis of Constituency-Level Support for the USDP in 2012 and 2015 
 
           Year    
Explanatory Variables  2012    2015 
2010 % USDP    0.43 (0.12)*   0.58 (0.15)* 
2010 % NUP    0.26 (0.12)*   0.36 (0.15)* 
2010 % NDF    0.17 (0.15)   0.45 (0.19)* 
Δ Turnout, 2010-2012  -0.08 (0.06)   - 
Δ Turnout, 2010-2015  -    -0.20 (0.08)* 
Ayyarwaddy State   0.04 (0.04)   0.09 (0.04)+ 
Bago State    0.01 (0.04)   0.05 (0.05) 
Magway State    -0.02 (0.04)   -0.02 (0.04) 
Mandalay State   0.03 (0.03)   -0.04 (0.04) 
Mon State    0.03 (0.06)   0.10 (0.08) 
Napyitaw State   0.07 (0.04)+   0.06 (0.05) 
Sagaing State    0.03 (0.04)   0.06 (0.05) 
Shan State    -0.03 (0.06)   0.13 (0.08) 
Tanintharyi State   -0.04 (0.05)   -0.06 (0.07) 
Yangon State    -    - 
Constant    -0.11 (0.10)   -0.18 (0.12) 
χ2      66.11*    67.52* 
R
2
      0.63    0.62 
n      37    37 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, two-tailed tests.  Entries are linear regression coefficients with seemingly unrelated standard 
errors in parentheses.   
 
 
 
 
